Missional Strategies for North Korea

Abstract

North Korea remains one of the world’s most closed societies, yet a recently compiled, unprecedented dataset of 6,351 defector interviews provides rare cultural insight. This study analyzes patterns in communication, trust, authority, and worldview drawn from these testimonies to inform future gospel witness when the peninsula opens. Rather than offering abstract theorizing, it grounds its insights in empirical data and highlights practical implications for equipping the global church with cultural fluency, holistic mission strategies, and contextual discipleship. These implications include relational outreach, trauma-informed care, ethical renewal, intercultural training, and the wise use of cultural media as entry points, preparing multiethnic teams for the unique challenges and opportunities of a post-isolation era.

Introduction

For decades, North Korea has remained one of the most isolated nations in the world, its culture and inner life largely hidden behind a formidable political and ideological veil. While smaller-scale studies and anecdotal reports from defectors have offered glimpses into the nation’s dynamics, comprehensive, large-scale cultural data has been absent. This has left missionaries, pastors, and Christian leaders with limited tools for understanding the deeper cultural realities that shape communication, trust, authority, and worldview among North Koreans.

This situation changed significantly with the release of an unprecedented body of research: interviews with 6,351 North Korean defectors conducted by the South Korean government.¹ Although the original purpose of this massive study was primarily economic and policy-related, it contains rich cultural insights that, when carefully analyzed, can equip the global church for more informed, sensitive, and strategic mission engagement.

The significance of this data goes beyond mere phenomenological description; it offers vital insights for shaping future gospel ministry in the unique context of North Korea when the door eventually opens. That opening could come suddenly. While North Korea’s agricultural output has improved somewhat since 2010, the food security situation for much of the population remains precarious.² The United Nations Resident Coordinator for North Korea in 2017 estimates that about 10.3 million people, or 41% of North Korea’s population, are in fact undernourished.³

Scripture calls the church to readiness in proclaiming the gospel to all nations (Matt 24:14) and to be prepared to give an answer for the hope within (1 Pet 3:15). This readiness is not passive waiting but intentional preparation, as Paul urged Timothy to ‘preach the word . . . in season and out of season’ (2 Tim 4:2), and as the early church showed by taking the opportunities God sovereignly allowed for new gospel witness (Acts 8:4–5). Times of geopolitical change can open great and unprecedented doors for gospel witness, though even these may not remain open for long.

If such a transition occurs in North Korea, the early years may be the most formative for establishing a biblically faithful witness. Yet increased spiritual openness after unification will not automatically result in sound biblical understanding. Many will carry deeply ingrained worldviews shaped by decades of state ideology and fear-based indoctrination. Without careful, relational discipleship, the gospel could be misunderstood as either a foreign political tool or as just another man-made ideology competing with Juche, rather than the transformative truth of Christ and his gospel.⁴

While trained evangelists and printed Bibles will be essential when North Korea opens, preparation shaped only by Western or other familiar cultural settings will not be enough. Decades of isolation have left North Korea’s cultural dynamics largely unknown, yet these realities will profoundly shape how the gospel is heard and lived out. Mission readiness must therefore include training that reflects North Korea’s own values, communication styles, relationships, and authority structures. Such culturally informed preparation will be crucial from the very first day the door opens so that ministry can take root faithfully in its unique cultural and sociopolitical-historical context.

Given these realities, this article draws on the 6,351-interview dataset to highlight four major cultural domains critical for gospel work: Communication Patterns, Social Trust & Relational Networks, Collective Identity & Authority Structures, and Religious Perception & Worldview Indicators. For each, I summarize representative characteristics from the data and offer missional implications for future ministry.

Cultural Characteristics

Communication Patterns and Cultural Exchange

• Public vs. private divergence: The report notes that North Korea has a ‘totalitarian system of thought control, surveillance, propaganda, and fear’. This contrasts with the private sphere where people are gradually expressing ‘veiled frustration or satire’ as they consume foreign media and engage with it.⁵
• Increased Communication Breakdown Between Authorities and the Public: The report notes a ‘growing divergence between the behavior of the North Korean authorities and the public sentiment of North Koreans.’ This suggests a ‘public vs. private divergence’ where scripted unity in public contrasts with frustration in private. ⁶
• Extreme Oppression of Personal Expression and Human Rights: As an anti-rule of law state, residents live under closure of personal freedom and expressions of self.⁷

These dynamics suggest that the gospel will likely be received first in hidden, informal, and relational contexts rather than through public proclamation. Ministries should leverage defector-led media and contextualized gospel channels—testimonies, hymns, and digital platforms—that resonate with honor–shame dynamics and the longing for authentic truth. Safe dialogue spaces such as small groups will be essential, providing environments where people can process faith without fear. Discipleship must include intentional training in discernment and critical thinking, equipping believers to evaluate cultural narratives biblically and unlearn decades of propaganda.

Social Trust and Relational Networks

• Transactional Trust: The document shows that trust is often transactional and based on calculated risk. For example, the use of private loans from ‘money lenders and changers’ grew, even as trust in the state’s financial system collapsed.⁸
• Secret-Sharing Networks: Despite intensified control, ‘more than 80 percent of the North Korean defectors surveyed said they had watched foreign videos’, indicating the existence of resilient informal trust chains.⁹ 
• Broker Trust: The report notes the rise of ‘professional real estate agent’ and ‘housing brokers’ as people navigated the informal housing market, suggesting that a ‘broker trust’ supersedes kin in some situations.¹⁰ 

These patterns show that trust will be decisive for how the gospel takes root in North Korea. The church will need to build credibility through consistent presence and transparent relationships. Cross-cultural understanding and reconciliation between North Koreans and the global body of Christ should be prioritized, ensuring that believers worldwide welcome and walk with them as full members of Christ’s family. At the same time, prayer and advocacy can promote wider reconciliation with other ethnic communities, recognizing that mistrust or prejudices may emerge both from North Koreans toward other groups they encounter and from those groups toward them. Church planting strategies may also need to begin small, with micro- to meso-sized fellowships that dilute fear of large institutions and provide a relationally safe, credible witness in contrast to North Korea’s ingrained patterns of exploitation and intimidation.

Collective Identity and Authority Structures (Power Distance)

• Eroding Ideological Reverence: The report explicitly states that there is a ‘growing divergence between the behavior of the North Korean authorities and the public sentiment of North Koreans.’ This is a ‘selective loyalty erosion’ where outward obedience remains but internal support for the regime wanes.¹¹
• More individualistic tendency than collectivistic tendency supposed: ‘Regarding the statement, “Personal work is more important than work at the workplace,” a total of 53.0% of all respondents reported they believed that personal goals were more important than work at the workplace when they lived in North Korea.’¹²
• Institutional Skepticism: North Koreans ‘generally do not believe that their society is ruled by law’ and ‘that law enforcement officials comply with the law’. This indicates a deep-seated ‘institutional skepticism’ towards the state.¹³
• Bribery as a System: The report notes that ‘bribery was inevitable to get things done’ and that it is a ‘widespread perception among North Koreans’.¹⁴

These realities call for anchoring identity formation in Christ in ways that contrast with corrupted systems of authority and pervasive bribery, cultivating new communities marked by honesty, humility, and justice. Such identity formation must counter institutional skepticism by showing the church as trustworthy, transparent, and servant-hearted. Training servant leaders who embody relational trust and Christlike humility, rejecting authoritarian abuses while modeling biblical authority and shared responsibility, will also be vital for North Korean missions.

Religious Perception and Worldview Indicators

• Juche Overshadowed by Practicality: The official state ideology of Juche is being ‘overshadowed by practicality’ when food and survival dominate priorities. ¹⁵
• High Openness to Subterranean or Outside Culture: The percentage of respondents who had watched foreign videos using information devices while living in North Korea has exceeded 80% since 2011.¹⁶ This suggests widespread exposure to outside cultural content and engagement with perspectives beyond state controls.
• Moral Currency Shifts: A total of 48.1% of all respondents said that they had felt that personal work was more important than sacrificing for the regime while they lived in North Korea, 18.9 percent point higher than the 29.2% who said that sacrificing for the regime was more important, indicating a shift in ‘moral currency’ from loyalty to the state to individual well-being.¹⁷

These shifts call for trauma-informed pastoral care and safe communities that address both the survivalist mentality and the disillusionment with Juche, helping believers discover in Christ not only practical provision but enduring meaning, eternal value, life’s true purpose, and lasting hope. Contextualizing the gospel to speak to shame, suffering, and meaning—presenting Christ as the healer of shame, the companion in suffering, and the giver of true significance—will be critical. Discipleship must also provide patient, layered worldview teaching that recognizes the need for intensive reorientation after decades of indoctrination.

Conclusion

In light of ongoing political and global shifts, North Korea may open far sooner than many anticipate. The global church must be ready to extend the gospel to the tens of millions of North Koreans who have long been spiritually deprived. This calling does not rest on the South Korean church alone; it is a shared mission for believers worldwide—to watch expectantly, pray fervently, and labor together with faith and unity when the door finally opens.

Endnotes

1. Ministry of Unification, Report on North Korea’s Economy and Society as Perceived by 6,351 Defectors, by Lee Wooyoung, Ko Kwangyoung, Kim Sungkyung, Park Juhwa, Yang Moonsoo, Yu Youngsoo, Lee Chulsoo, and Cho Yongshin (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2023), Government Publications Registration Number 11-1250000-000157-01.
2. Caitlin Campbell, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Wil Mackey, Mark E. Manyin, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, North Korea: U.S. Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation, CRS Report R41259 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, July 27, 2018), 15.
3. UN Resident Coordinator for DPR Korea, DPR Korea Needs and Priorities 2018, March 2018, https://reliefweb.int/
4. Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “juche,” accessed August 28, 2025, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/juche_n?tl=true. The entry defines Juche as “the political ideology associated with North Korea (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), which aims to achieve national autonomy through the rule of a single leader, the maintenance of a strong military, and the pursuit of economic self-sufficiency.” It also notes that “Juche is often regarded negatively as fostering totalitarianism, ultra-nationalism, and a culture of subjugation and violence in North Korea.”
5. Ministry of Unification, Report on North Korea’s Economy and Society as Perceived by 6,351 Defectors, by Lee Wooyoung, Ko Kwangyoung, Kim Sungkyung, Park Juhwa, Yang Moonsoo, Yu Youngsoo, Lee Chulsoo, and Cho Yongshin (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2023), Government Publications Registration Number 11-1250000-000157-01, 446. 
6. Ibid., 9.
7. Ibid., 348.
8. Ibid., 170.
9. Ibid., 9.
10. Ibid., 14, 188.
11. Ibid., 9.
12. Ibid., 343.
13. Ibid., 9,23.
14. Ibid., 23, 350. 
15. Ibid., 47,312,335.
16. Ibid., 18,24.
17. Ibid., 345.